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Abstract
We study the eﬀect of product market competition on the incentives to in-
novate and the economy’s rate of growth in an endogenous growth model. We
extend previous works in industrial organization by assuming that innovation is
sequential and cumulative, and early endogenous growth models by accounting
for the possibility that in each period many asymmetric ﬁrms (i.e., an endoge-
nously determined number of successive innovators) are simultaneously active.
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1We identify the price eﬀect, the front loading of proﬁts, and the productive
eﬃciency eﬀe c ta s s o c i a t e dw i t ha ni n c r e a s ei nc o m p e t i t i v ep r e s s u r e .T h ep r i c e
eﬀect reduces the incentives to innovate, but both the front loading of proﬁts
and the productive eﬃciency eﬀect raise the incentives to innovate. We demon-
strate circumstances in which the productive eﬃciency eﬀect dominates the
price eﬀect. In these circumstances, the front loading of proﬁts and the fact
that the productive eﬃciency eﬀect dominates the price eﬀect compound to
make the equilibrium rate of growth increase with the intensity of competition.
21. INTRODUCTION
It has often been claimed that competition is good for innovation and growth.
Indeed, what empirical evidence is available suggests an increasing, or inverted U-
shaped, relationship between competition and growth.1 However, there is no straight-
forward theoretical explanation for such a positive link. Quite to the contrary, early
models of endogenous growth tend to conclude that tougher competition erodes the
innovator’s prospective monopoly rents and is therefore detrimental to growth.
This paper aims to reconcile the Schumpeterian view that the search for monopoly
rents is the primary engine of growth and empirical evidence that competition is
good for growth. We argue that the conclusion drawn by early endogenous-growth
models crucially depends upon the simplifying assumption that at every point in
time the technological leader is the only active ﬁrm in each industry. In more highly
structured models, which allow for two or more ﬁrms to be simultaneously active in
the same industry, two qualitatively new eﬀects arise — the front loading of proﬁts
and the productive eﬃciency eﬀect — that can generate a positive relationship between
product market competition, innovation and growth.
Any deﬁnition of competition involves the idea that more intense competition
reduces the equilibrium price, thus exerting downward pressure on the innovator’s
prospective rents (we call this eﬀect the price eﬀect). However, in more competitive
markets, a larger fraction of these rents accrues in the early stages of the innovative
ﬁrm’s life cycle (this we call the front loading of proﬁts following Segal and Whin-
ston (2003)) and low-cost ﬁrms have a larger portion of the market, which reduces
total industry costs (productive eﬃciency eﬀect). We ﬁnd circumstances in which
t h ep r o d u c t i v ee ﬃciency eﬀect dominates the price eﬀect, namely, when the size of
innovations is large and/or competition is strong. In these circumstances, the front
loading of proﬁts and the fact that the productive eﬃciency eﬀect dominates the price
eﬀect compound to make the equilibrium rate of growth increase with the intensity
of competition.
As a modeling strategy, we depart from standard quality ladder models of endoge-
nous growth only to the extent that is necessary to allow for several ﬁrms to be
1See Nickell (1996), Blundell, Griﬃths and van Reenen (1995) and Aghion et al. (2002).
3simultaneously active in each industry. We therefore stick to the standard assump-
tion that innovative technological knowledge is proprietary; this implies that ﬁrms
are asymmetric in that they have access to diﬀerent technologies. In early quality
ladder models, the fact that only the technological leader is active in the product mar-
ket rests on the assumption that either innovations are drastic (Aghion and Howitt
(1992)),2 or else ﬁrms compete al àBertrand (Grossman and Helpman (1991)). To
allow for diﬀerent market structures, we focus on the case of non drastic innovations,
contrasting Bertrand with Cournot competition. With asymmetric ﬁrms, the number
of active ﬁrms and their respective market shares will depend on the mode of com-
petition, Bertrand or Cournot, and the size of innovations. (In fact we use a more
general reduced-form model which encompasses the Bertrand and Cournot equilibria
as special cases and yields a continuous index of the intensity of competition.)
Our model possesses a steady state in which m+1ﬁrms are simultaneously active,
i.e., the latest innovator and m past innovators, where m is endogenously determined
(with Bertrand competition, m =0 ). An innovator, that does not conduct any further
research, will nonetheless remain active, and reap positive proﬁts, for m+1periods (a
period is the random time interval between two innovations, as in Aghion and Howitt
(1992)). As new innovations arrive, the original innovator’s market share shrinks
b u th ew i l le x i tt h em a r k e to n l ya f t e rm +1successive innovations have occurred.
Consequently, the value of an innovation, and hence the incentive to innovate, is a
weighted average of all active ﬁrms’ proﬁts, where the weights reﬂect the expected
length of time periods, discounting, and growth. In a stationary environment with
no discounting each innovator would get total industry proﬁts over time periods,
irrespective of the mode of competition.
We show that a rise in competitive pressure makes proﬁts accrue sooner to the
innovator: for example, with Cournot competition each innovator collects its rents
over various time periods, whereas with Bertrand competition all of the rents are
obtained in the one period starting when the innovation is achieved. In a stationary
environment with no discounting, such a front loading of proﬁts would have no eﬀect
on the incentive to innovate. In our model, however, delayed proﬁts increase over
2An innovation is drastic if the innovator is unconstrained by outside competition and can there-
fore engage in monopoly pricing.
4time periods as the economy grows, but ﬁrms discount future rents. The transversal-
ity condition implies that discounting prevails over growth, and so the front loading
of proﬁts raises the incentive to innovate implying that competition tends to be pos-
itively associated with growth.
The intensity of competition aﬀects the incentive to innovate also via its eﬀect on
total industry proﬁts. We decompose the eﬀect of product market competition on
industry proﬁts into a price eﬀect and a productive eﬃciency eﬀect. The price eﬀect
is the change in industry proﬁts that would obtain if all active ﬁrms shared the same
technology. This eﬀect is negative, i.e. more intense competition would lead to lower
industry proﬁts if ﬁrms were symmetric. With asymmetric ﬁrms, however, a rise in
the intensity of competition raises the market shares of low-cost ﬁrms, and lowers
those of high-cost ﬁrms. For example, under Bertrand competition all of the output
i sp r o d u c e db yt h em o s te ﬃcient ﬁrm — the latest innovator; whereas under Cournot
competition high-cost ﬁrms produce a positive share of total output. Therefore, a
rise in competitive pressure improves the productive eﬃciency of the industry which
is good for industry proﬁts.
We identify two circumstances in which the productive eﬃciency eﬀect outweighs
the price eﬀect. First, when innovations are almost drastic, the equilibrium price is
close to the monopoly price irrespective of the mode of competition. In this case, the
price eﬀect is second order. However, with Cournot competition the high-cost ﬁrm
holds a positive market share (when innovations are almost drastic, only two ﬁrms
are active in each period); the productive eﬃciency eﬀect is therefore ﬁrst order.
Thus, with large innovations industry proﬁts are greater under Bertrand competition
than under Cournot competition. (In fact, with large innovations industry proﬁts are
monotonically increasing in the intensity of competition). Second, we show that in
the vicinity of the Bertrand equilibrium the productive eﬃciency eﬀect is remarkably
large: indeed, a unit decrease in the equilibrium price lowers the industry average
cost by as much as one! Therefore, independently of the size of innovations, when
competition is strong a further increase in the intensity of competition must increase
industry proﬁts.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the related
literature. In Section 3, we analyze the value of an innovation when innovation is
5sequential but innovators are not immediately displaced by the occurrence of the next
innovation. We show that the incentive to innovate depends both on industry proﬁts,
and the distribution of proﬁts across active ﬁrms. Section 4 studies how the intensity
of product market competition impacts on the incentive to innovate. In Section 5, the
insights obtained in Sections 3 and 4 are embedded in a simple general equilibrium
endogenous growth model. Finally, Section 6 oﬀe r ss o m ec o n c l u d i n gr e m a r k s .
2. RELATED LITERATURE
Our paper is related to two diﬀerent literatures: the industrial organization liter-
ature that examines the eﬀect of product market competition on the incentives to
innovate, and the recent endogenous growth literature that tries to reconcile theory
and evidence on the relationship between competition and growth.
The industrial organization literature.–
The debate on the eﬀect of competition on the incentive to innovate goes back to
Schumpeter (1942) and Arrow (1962). Schumpeter (1942) claims that there exists
a positive correlation between innovation and market power. He argues that for a
variety of reasons a monopoly may likely develop and employ a more advanced tech-
nology than a competitive industry. This claim has been countered by Arrow (1962),
who argues that the incentive to innovate is higher in competitive industries, because
a monopolist’s post-innovation proﬁts replace his pre-innovation proﬁts, whereas this
replacement eﬀect vanishes under competition. Moving to the case of oligopoly, Del-
bono and Denicolò (1990) ﬁnd that Bertrand duopolists have greater incentives to
innovate than Cournot duopolists when the product is homogenous. However, Bester
and Petrakis (1993) and Bonanno and Haworth (1998) show that this result can be
reversed with horizontal and vertical product diﬀerentiation, respectively, and Syme-
onidis (2003) shows that the same is true when the products are both horizontally
and vertically diﬀerentiated. Qiu (1997) develops a model in which the incentive to
innovate is greater with Cournot competition even if the product is homogeneous.
Boone (2000, 2001) generalizes these ﬁndings and shows that the relation between
competition and incentives to innovate is generally non monotone. In short, the in-
dustrial organization literature on the eﬀect of product market competition on the
6value of an innovation is largely inconclusive.3 In part, these conﬂicting results are
due to diﬀerent assumptions on the nature of technical progress (tournament or non-
tournament) and on who conducts the research (incumbents or outside ﬁrms). The
remaining ambiguity rests on the fact that in more highly competitive industries the
technological leader has a larger market share, and this market share eﬀect may or
may not outweigh the negative eﬀect of more intense competition on the equilibrium
price.
All of these papers focus on a single innovation framework and therefore identify
the incentive to innovate with the (increase in the) proﬁts of the technological leader.
We depart from this literature by modeling an inﬁnite sequence of innovations. In
our framework the incentive to innovate cannot be equated to the leader’s proﬁts, but
is a weighted average of all active ﬁrms’ proﬁts. As such, the positive eﬀect of more
intense competition on the leader’s market share does not translate mechanically into
higher incentives to innovate, but operates only via the productive eﬃciency eﬀect
and the front loading of proﬁts. Our contribution is to show that these indirect eﬀects
may nevertheless be substantial.
Segal and Whinston (2003) independently study a model of successive innovations
in which each innovator stays active for two periods. Our analysis has many elements
in common with theirs, including the front loading of proﬁts. However, their model
diﬀers from ours in various respects; for example, they posit a rectangular demand
function, a ﬁxed timing of innovations, and an exogenously given number of ﬁrms
(m =1 ). Moreover, they do not compare Bertrand and Cournot competition, but
focus on various business practices that may or may not be anti-competitive. Notwith-
standing these diﬀerences, our conclusions and theirs complement and reinforce each
other.
The growth literature.–
A small endogenous growth literature tries to reconcile theory and empirical evi-
dence on the relationship between competition and growth. One strand of this litera-
ture introduces agency issues into the picture (Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey (1999)).
3Equally inconclusive is the related literature on the eﬀects of product market competition on
managerial incentives: see Raith (2003).
7In these models, non-proﬁt maximizing managers delay the adoption of new technolo-
gies until proﬁts fall below a threshold level. The eﬀect of tougher competition is to
reduce proﬁts thereby speeding up the adoption process.
In the non-tournament models of van de Klundert and Smulders (1997) and Peretto
(1999), tougher competition reduces the equilibrium number of varieties and increases
t h es i z eo fa c t i v eﬁrms, which raises their incentive to innovate. These papers posit a
positive, deterministic relationship between the level of R&D investment and the size
of the innovation. In a related contribution, d’Aspremont, Dos Santos Ferreira and
Gerard-Varet (2002) consider the case in which R&D investment aﬀects the proba-
bility of success rather than the size of innovations, but still many ﬁrms can innovate
simultaneously. Thus, in each period there are some ﬁrms which have successfully
innovated, and others that have access only to the prior art, which is in the public
domain. They compare the Cournot and Bertrand equilibria, and also analyze an
intermediate case in which all successful innovators co-operatively engage in limit
pricing. They show that growth is fastest in this intermediate case, and conclude
that the relationship between competition and growth is inverted U-shaped.
Aghion et al. (2001) develop a general equilibrium model of step-by-step tech-
nical progress in which two ﬁrms produce horizontally diﬀerentiated products, and
show that more competition (as measured by an increase in the degree of product
substitutability)4 may be beneﬁcial to growth. In step-by-step models, ﬁrms’ incen-
tive to innovate is greatest when they are neck-and-neck (which can never occur in
leapfrogging models). In such a state, the incentive to gain a technological lead is
greater when competition is intense; however, with ﬁerce competition the fraction
of industries in which ﬁrms are neck-and-neck tends to be lower. The interaction of
these eﬀects can generate an increasing, or inverted U-shaped, relationship between
competition and growth. Encaoua and Ulph (2000) argue that introducing into this
model the possibility of leapfrogging strengthens the positive eﬀect of competition on
growth.
The main diﬀerence between these papers and ours is that we do not make any
special assumption: we use the standard leapfrogging model with proﬁt-maximizing
4In a simpliﬁed version of the model, Aghion, Harris and Vickers (1997) parametrize the intensity
of competition also as a switch from Cournot to Bertrand competition.
8ﬁrms and tournament technical progress. The novelty of our analysis lies in that we
allow for several ﬁrms to be simultaneously active — which requires that innovations
are non-drastic and competition is Cournot rather than Bertrand.
3. THE INCENTIVE TO INNOVATE WITH SEQUENTIAL
INNOVATIONS
In this section we analyze the key determinants of the incentives to innovate in a
model of repeated innovations. We extend previous works in industrial organization
by assuming that innovation is sequential and cumulative, and earlier endogenous
growth models by accounting for the possibility that in each period many ﬁrms are
simultaneously active.
Throughout, the following assumptions will be maintained. Innovative activity
happens at a rate determined by R&D eﬀorts. In each period k,w h e r ek − 1 is the
number of past innovations, there is a patent race for innovation k.( T i m e i s c o n -
tinuous but can be divided into periods, where a period is the random time interval
between two innovations.) Patent races come in a sequence in the sense that only
after one innovation is achieved can the race for the next one begin. The size of
innovations is exogenous but the timing of innovations is a probabilistic function of
t h ea m o u n ti n v e s t e di nR & Db yr e s e a r c hﬁrms; speciﬁcally, the R&D eﬀort deter-
mines the expected time of successful completion of the R&D project according to a
Poisson discovery process with a hazard rate zk. We assume that incumbents do no
research; research is conducted by outsiders, and so in each period the current leader
is systematically replaced.5
To ﬁx ideas, suppose that there is perfect, inﬁnitely-lived patent protection, so that
nobody can imitate the innovation without infringing the patent.6 Because innovative
technological knowledge is proprietary, in period k only the (k −i)th innovator, who
5The possibility that incumbents invest in R&D so that technological leadership may persist over
time periods will be discussed in the concluding section.
6In practice, there are various means of protecting innovative technological knowledge, including
patents, copyrights, secrecy, lead time etc. Typically the protection an innovator enjoys declines
over time, but for simplicity we abstract from this additional source of dynamics.
9holds a patent on the (k−i)th innovation, can practice it.7 Under the assumption that
all innovations are obtained by outsiders, nobody holds multiple patents. In period
k,i n n o v a t o rk − 1 is the technological leader, but we allow for m past innovators to
remain active. Let πi,k be the ﬂow of proﬁt earned by innovator k − 1 − i in period
k.T h u s ,π0,k is the technological leader’s proﬁt; π1,k is the proﬁt of the second most
eﬃcient ﬁrm (i.e., innovator k − 2); and so on. Later m and zk will be determined
endogenously (for example, m =0with Bertrand competition), but for the moment
we take them as given.
To determine the expected value of innovation k, E(Vk), o n em u s tt a k ei n t oa c c o u n t
that the kth innovator’s rents will not be terminated by the occurrence of the (k+1)th
innovation: although competition from the (k +1 ) th innovator will reduce all past
innovators’ market shares and proﬁts, only the least eﬃcient among active ﬁrms will
be driven out of the market when a new innovation occurs. Thus, E(Vk) is determined







where r is the interest rate. This equation says that securities issued by the leader pay
the ﬂow proﬁt π0,k+1 in period k+1, less the expected capital loss zk+1 [E(Vk) − E(V 1
k )]
that will be incurred when the next innovation is achieved. Such a capital loss is the
diﬀerence between the value of being leader and that of being the second most eﬃcient
ﬁrm in the market, i.e. E(Vk) − E(V 1
k ), where E(V h
k ) is the value of innovation k
after h periods, i.e. in period k+h. The value of being the second most eﬃcient ﬁrm
in the market, E(V 1
k ), is in turn determined by the asset condition
rE(V
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and so on. Eventually, after m+1innovations, the kth innovator will exit the market,
so that E(V
m+1
k )=0 . Consequently, we have
rE(V
m
k )=πm,k+m+1 − zk+m+1E(V
m
k ).
7We follow the vast majority of endogenous growth models in ruling out patent licensing. The
standard justiﬁcation for this assumption is that licensing agreements between successive innovators
would have anti-competitive eﬀects and thus would be prohibited by antitrust authorities. When
licensing improves productive eﬃciency, however, such a justiﬁcation loses some of its strength. After
developing our results, we discuss licensing agreements more fully in the concluding section.



































that is, the value of the kth innovation is the discounted value of the innovator’s
proﬁts, where the interest rate is augmented by the factor zk+1 that captures the
expected duration of the innovator’s leadership. More generally, equation (1) says
that the value of the kth innovation is the expected present value of all future proﬁts
that the innovator will get in the m +1periods for which he will be active in the
product market. In each period, the discount factor is augmented to keep into account
the probability that the current ﬂow of proﬁts is terminated by the occurrence of
the next innovation. Moreover, because innovation is cumulative future proﬁts are




(r+zk+h), which can be interpreted as the “discounting-
adjusted probabilities” that future innovations are achieved: with a Poisson discovery
process, each future innovation eventually occurs with probability one, but since there





the “discounting-adjusted probability” that innovation k+i occurs and period k+i+1
proﬁts start accruing to the kth innovator.
More intuition on the determinants of the incentive to innovate can be gained by
focusing on the case of a stationary environment in which zk and πi,k are constant
across periods. In the limiting case in which z tends to zero, the value of the innovation
will then depend only on the technological leader’s proﬁt, π0. This limiting case
eﬀectively corresponds to a single innovation framework, like that envisaged in the
early industrial organization literature. In the polar case in which r tends to 0,




πi. In general, both industry proﬁts and the proﬁt distribution across ﬁrms
matter.
4. INTENSITY OF COMPETITION AND INCENTIVE TO
INNOVATE
In this section we analyze the eﬀect of an increase in the intensity of competition
on the incentives to innovate. Building on the result of the previous section, we focus
on how competition aﬀects industry proﬁts and their distribution across ﬁrms. We
identify the front loading of proﬁts, the price eﬀect, and the productive eﬃciency eﬀect
associated with a change in competitive pressure. We also demonstrate circumstances
in which the productive eﬃciency eﬀect dominates the price eﬀect. To underscore
that our results are independent of the details of the particular growth model that
we develop below, the analysis is cast in a partial equilibrium framework.
Preliminaries.–
Consider an industry comprising s +1asymmetric ﬁrms, indexed by i =0 ,1,...,s,
producing a homogeneous product. Let ﬁrms’ marginal cost be constant at ci per
unit, and label ﬁrms so that c0 <c 1 <. . .<c s.T h u s , ﬁrm 0 is the technological
leader (e.g. the latest innovator), ﬁrm 1 is the leader’s most eﬃcient competitor
(e.g. the penultimate innovator) and so on. The number of ﬁrms that are active in
equilibrium, m+1, is determined endogenously; ﬁrm m is the least eﬃcient amongst
active ﬁrms. Let demand be given by X(p),w h e r ep is price, X is output, and X(.) is
a strictly decreasing and twice diﬀerentiable function on [0, ¯ p] and is zero on [¯ p,∞).I t
follows that inverse demand, p(X), is decreasing and twice diﬀerentiable on [0,X(0)].
For simplicity, we assume that the following regularity condition holds: 2p0(X)+
p00(X)X<0 on [0,X(0)]. This assumption of decreasing marginal revenue simpliﬁes
the exposition (in particular, it implies that the function Π(X)=[ p(X) − ψ]X is
strictly concave for any constant ψ<¯ p) but is not needed for many of our results.
The individual ﬁrm’s proﬁtf u n c t i o ni sπi =[ p(X) − ci]xi,w h e r exi is the individual
ﬁrm’s output. To keep the analysis interesting, assume that c1 is lower than the
monopoly price associated with c0, pM(c0)=a r gm a x ( p−c0)X(p). If this assumption
12failed, ﬁrm 0 could engage in monopoly pricing without fear of being displaced by its
competitors.
Bertrand and Cournot competition.–
Initially we parametrize the degree of competition by a switch from Cournot to
Bertrand competition. With Bertrand competition, the outcome is a limit-pricing
equilibrium in which price equals the marginal cost of the second most eﬃcient ﬁrm
and all of the output is produced by the low-cost ﬁrm: pB = c1, mB =0 ,a n d
xB











i and mC i st h eg r e a t e s ti n t e g e rs u c ht h a tpC ≥ cm holds. For









that is, in the Cournot equilibrium, the ratio of any two active ﬁrms’ market shares
equals the ratio of their respective price-cost margins. This relationship trivially holds
also in the Bertrand equilibrium. However, in the Cournot equilibrium high-cost ﬁrms
hold positive market shares, which means that the Cournot equilibrium exhibits pro-
ductive ineﬃciency. This productive ineﬃciency is important to explain why industry
proﬁts can be larger under Bertrand competition, even if the Bertrand equilibrium
price is lower than the Cournot price.
It is indeed well known that with Cournot competition both the equilibrium price
and the number of active ﬁrms are higher than under Bertrand competition. There-
fore, a switch from Cournot to Bertrand competition is associated with an increase in
the intensity of competition. To facilitate the comparison we now present a general
solution that encompasses the Bertrand and Cournot equilibria as special cases. This
will also allow us to obtain a continuous index of the intensity of competition.
8With constant marginal costs, the assumption 2p0(X)+p00(X)X<0 ensures that the second
order conditions are satisﬁed and the Cournot equilibrium is unique.
13A reduced-form model.–
The intensity of competition can be measured in many diﬀerent ways, but any
deﬁnition of competition involves the idea that more intense competition reduces
the equilibrium price of a homogeneous product. Accordingly, we use a reduced form
speciﬁcation in which the intensity of competition is simply identiﬁed with the (inverse
of the) equilibrium price.9 Thus, let p range from the Cournot equilibrium price pC
to the Bertrand equilibrium price pB = c1 as product market competition increases.
Industry output is X(p). To pin down the industry equilibrium, assume that the
ratio of any two active ﬁrms’ market shares equals the ratio of their respective price-







i,j =0 ,...,m. (3)
The number of active ﬁrms, m(p) is determined as a function of p as the largest
integer such that p>c m (it is understood that xi =0when p<c i).T h e a c t i v e





To show existence and uniqueness of the solution, note that for any given p, m(p) is
uniquely determined. Equations (3) provide m(p) independent conditions. Together
with the adding up condition, they comprise a system of m(p)+1linearly independent
equations in the m(p)+1unknowns x0,...,xm, the solution of which exists and is
unique. It is easy to show that individual outputs are
xi =
p − ci









is the unweighted average of the marginal costs of active
9Previous work on competition and growth has often measured the intensity of competition by
the inverse of the elasticity of demand, which determines the size of the innovator’s mark-up. Our
reduced-form model allows us to obtain a continuous measure of the intensity of competition that
disentangles the eﬀects of a change in the degree of competition from those associated with changes in
structural (taste and/or technology) parameters that ultimately determine the elasticity of demand.
14ﬁrms.
Clearly, because (3) holds both at the Bertrand and Cournot equilibria, these equi-
libria are reproduced for p = pB and p = pC, respectively. For intermediate values of
the price, our solution can be interpreted as a reduced form of a more highly struc-
tured model where ﬁrms can collude partially (Cabral (1995)), or can choose both
capacities and prices (Maggi (1996)).10 Alternatively, and perhaps more prudently,
the solution can be thought of as an analytical tool that helps compare the Bertrand
and Cournot equilibria.
T h ep r o d u c t i v ee ﬃciency eﬀect.–
Consider now an increase in the intensity of competition, i.e. a fall in the equilib-
rium price. If the number of active ﬁrms and their respective market shares stayed




πi.T h i si st h eprice eﬀect. The reason why the price eﬀe c ti sn e g a t i v ei s




Xci is the industry average
cost, i.e. weighted average of ﬁrms’ marginal costs. With constant market shares, ¯ c
is constant; since Π(X) is quasi-concave, any fall in price must then reduce industry
proﬁts if the price is lower than the monopoly price. However, the number of active
ﬁrms and their market shares change with the equilibrium price. As a consequence,
¯ c changes with the intensity of competition, and the associated change in industry
costs and proﬁts is the productive eﬃciency eﬀect.
Formally, the change in industry proﬁts associated with a change in the intensity
10If fact, our solution coincides with the conjectural variations equilibrium under the assumption
that the conjectural variations parameter is the same for all ﬁrms. To see this, note that in a
conjectural variations equilibrium, the ﬁrst-order conditions (2) become
(1 + φi)p0(X)xi + p = ci i =0 ,...,m
where φi is the conjectural variations parameter of ﬁrm i. Provided that φi is the same for all ﬁrms,




= X +( p − ¯ c)
dX









We now show that an increase in the intensity of competition improves the productive
eﬃciency of the industry; a fall in the equilibrium price, that is to say, lowers the
industry average cost.
Lemma 1 The productive eﬃciency eﬀect is positive.












[m(p)+1 ]( p − ˆ c)
2 > 0 (6)
where σ2
c i st h ev a r i a n c eo fa c t i v eﬁrms’ marginal costs. ¥
The intuition behind Lemma 1 is that a rise in competitive pressure raises the
market shares of low-cost ﬁrms and lowers the market shares of high-cost ﬁrms. This
reduces the total cost at which any given industry output is produced. An immediate
corollary of Lemma 1 is that a switch from Cournot to Bertrand competition improves
the productive eﬃciency of the industry. This is obvious, because with Bertrand
competition all of the output is produced by the low-cost ﬁrm, whereas under Cournot
competition high-cost ﬁr m sh a v ep o s i t i v em a r k e ts h a r e s .
Before proceeding, we pause here to show that an increase in price is positively
associated with an (inverse) index of the intensity of competition that is commonly
used in empirical work, namely, the industry average price-cost margin (p − ¯ c). 12
11Because m(p) jumps up at certain critical points c1,c 2,...,cm as p increases, variables like out-
puts, proﬁts etc. are piecewise diﬀerentiable. Consequently, caution should be used in diﬀerentiating
those variables with respect to p. Any such derivative calculated at cj,w h e r ecj is the critical value
of p at which m jumps up from j − 1 to j, must be interpreted as the right derivative under the
conventional assumption xj(cj)=0 .
12To measure the intensity of competition, Nickell (1996) and others also use indices of market
concentration. In our model, however, an increase in price is negatively associated with market con-
16Lemma 2 Ar i s ei np r i c ep (weakly) raises the industry average price-cost margin
(p − ¯ c).
Proof. See the Appendix. ¥
With these preliminary results in place, we are now ready to state the main results
of this section.
Competition and industry proﬁts.–
We start focusing on the eﬀect of product market competition on industry proﬁts.
In particular, we look for circumstances in which the productive eﬃciency eﬀect
dominates the price eﬀect so that more intense competition raises industry proﬁts.
As is clear from equation (6), if ﬁrms were symmetric (σ2
c =0 ) the productive eﬃ-
ciency eﬀect would vanish. However, with asymmetric ﬁrms, σ2
c > 0, the productive
eﬃciency eﬀect is ﬁrst order. When the price eﬀect is second order, it must therefore
be dominated by the productive eﬃciency eﬀect. But the price eﬀect will, indeed, be
second order when the price is close to the monopoly price. This observation leads to
the following result.
Proposition 1 When the marginal cost of the second most eﬃcient ﬁrm c1 is close
to the monopoly price pM(c0),i n d u s t r yp r o ﬁts are greater under Bertrand competition
than under Cournot competition.
Proof. T h ep r o o fi si nt h eA p p e n d i x .H e r ew es k e t c ht h ep r o o fo fam o r eg e n e r a l
claim, i.e. that when c1 is close to pM(c0), industry proﬁts are monotonically increas-
ing in the intensity of competition. To prove this claim, note that when c1 is just
below pM(c0), p must be close to pM(c0);13 moreover, x1 must be close to zero and so





X be the Lorenz curve of the output distribution,
showing the proportion of industry output produced by any given percentage of the population of
ﬁrms, starting from the smallest ﬁrm. Proceeding as in the proof of Proposition 3 below, it can
be shown that a rise in price shifts the Lorenz curve LX down. This implies that as the price in-
creases, market concentration falls according to any of the most commonly used measures of market
concentration, like Cn, the sum of the market shares of the largest n ﬁrms, or the Herﬁndhal index.
13Remember that p ranges from pB = c1 to pC, which cannot exceed pM(c0).


















2[pM(c0) − ˆ c]2 < 0
Thus, industry proﬁts monotonically decrease with price.¥
The intuition is that at c1 = pM(c0) both Bertrand and Cournot competition
yield the monopoly solution. Starting from c1 = pM(c0),c o n s i d e rn o wt h ee ﬀect of
decreasing c1. With Bertrand competition, the presence of ﬁrm 1 now constrains the
low-cost ﬁrm (i.e., ﬁrm 0) that must price at p = c1, but when c1 is close to the
monopoly price the eﬀect of competition on the low-cost ﬁrm’s proﬁti ss e c o n do r d e r
—t h ep r o ﬁtf u n c t i o ni sﬂat at p = pM(c0). With Cournot competition a fall in c1
reduces the equilibrium price less than under Bertrand competition, but now it also
increases the high-cost ﬁrm’s market share. Since c1 >c 0, with Cournot competition
the negative eﬀect on industry proﬁts of a fall in c1 is ﬁrst order, whence the result
follows.
Proposition 1 might suggest that the productive eﬃciency eﬀect is small and can
prevail over the price eﬀect only if the latter is negligible. Quite to the contrary, the
productive eﬃciency eﬀect can be surprisingly large: a unit increase in the equilibrium
price can raise the average industry cost by as much as one! (Lemma 2 ensures
that ¯ c cannot increase by more than one.) This is indeed what happens in the
vicinity of the Bertrand equilibrium — the equilibrium which most quality ladder
models of endogenous growth with non-drastic innovations focus on. Consequently,
starting at Bertrand competition, a small decrease in the intensity of competition will
unambiguously lead to a fall in industry proﬁts.
Proposition 2 Starting at the Bertrand equilibrium price, a small increase in price
lowers industry proﬁts.
Proof. From (5) and (6) we get
dΠ
dp






2(p − ˆ c)2
18When p is slightly increased starting at p = pB = c1,o n l yt w oﬁrms, 0 and 1, will be
active. Consequently, σ2








Proposition 2 eﬀectively shows that starting at the Bertrand equilibrium price, a
small increase in price leaves the industry average price-cost margin (p−¯ c) unchanged.
The intuitive reason is that when p = c1, a unit increase in price raises the market
share of ﬁrm 1 (the high-cost ﬁrm) from zero to 1
c1−c0, and this causes a unit increase
in ¯ c. Because the industry average price-cost margin (p − ¯ c) is unchanged, a rise in
price must necessarily lower industry proﬁt.
[Figure 1 here]
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate Propositions 1 and 2, respectively, in the linear demand
case p =1− X with c0 =0 . Figure 1 plots industry proﬁts under Bertrand and
Cournot competition as c1 ranges from 0 (the symmetric case) to 0.50 (the monopoly
price). Industry proﬁts are greater with Bertrand competition for c1 > 0.28.F i g u r e2
displays the regions in which industry proﬁts increase or decrease with the intensity
of competition as c1 ranges from 0 to 1
2 and p ranges from pB = c1 to pC = 1+c1
3 .
Although our qualitative results are local, Figures 1 and 2 show that the productive
eﬃciency eﬀect prevails over the price eﬀect in a sizeable region of parameter values.
[Figure 2 here]
Competition and the distribution of proﬁts.–
Product market competition aﬀects not only the sum total of all ﬁrms’ proﬁts, but
also another key determinant of the incentive to innovate, namely, the distribution of
proﬁts across active ﬁrms. Accordingly, we now focus on how a rise in the intensity
of competition aﬀects the proﬁt distribution, for any given level of industry proﬁts.
Let the proﬁt distribution be the s +1 -dimensional vector Π =( π0,π1,...,πs).
Because c0 <c 1 < ... < cs,w eh a v eπ0 ≥ π1 ≥ ... ≥ πs, with strict inequalities






Π,w h e r eΠ is industry proﬁts. It shows the proportion of industry
proﬁts earned by any given percentage of the population of ﬁrms, starting from the
least proﬁtable ﬁrm.
Our next result is that the proﬁt distribution becomes more unequal according to
the Lorenz dominance criterion as competition becomes more intense. That is to say,
t h eL o r e n zc u r v eo ft h ep r o ﬁt distribution shifts down as the intensity of competition
increases. Lorenz dominance implies that proﬁt inequality would increase as the
intensity of competition increases according to a wide set of inequality measures.
Proposition 3 If there are at least two active ﬁrms, an increase in the intensity
of competition makes the proﬁt distribution more unequal according to the Lorenz
dominance criterion.
Proof. See the Appendix. ¥
Proposition 3 follows from the simple fact that low-cost ﬁrms gain, and high-cost
ﬁrms lose in relative terms when the market becomes more competitive. The reason is
twofold: ﬁrst, the market shares of low-cost ﬁrms tend to increase with the intensity
of competition, and second, when the equilibrium price falls, the percentage decrease
in the price-cost margin is larger for high-cost ﬁrms.
In the dynamic model of successive innovations to be developed presently, each
innovator will be active, and reap positive proﬁts, for m +1periods: in the ﬁrst
period after his innovation is achieved, he is the technological leader, in the second
period he is the second most eﬃcient ﬁr m ,i nt h et h i r dp e r i o dh ei st h et h i r dm o s t
eﬃcient amongst active ﬁrms, and so on. Over time periods, the innovator reaps total
industry proﬁts irrespective of the intensity of competition. However, the Lorenz
dominance result means that as the intensity of competition increases the innovator
will get a larger proportion of his prospective rents in the ﬁrst i periods for which
he is active, for all i =1 ,...,m (over m +1p e r i o d sh ea l w a y sg e t s1 0 0p e rc e n to f
industry proﬁts). This is the front loading of proﬁts associated with more intense
competition. Proposition 4 below shows that the front loading of proﬁts tends to
increase the incentives to innovate, for any given level of industry proﬁts.
205. A GROWTH MODEL
We now embed the insights from the previous sections in a simple growth model.
To eschew distracting assumptions, we use a one-sector version of the text-book model
of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, ch. 7), but the main results are more general and
can be reproduced in many other models with quality improvements.14
Preferences and technology.–
The economy is populated by identical individuals whose mass is normalized to 1.






so that the rate of time preference r coincides with the equilibrium rate of interest.
Each individual inelastically oﬀers one unit of labor.
The ﬁnal good y is produced in a perfectly competitive market using labor (which
is in ﬁxed supply) and an intermediate good the quality of which increases over time
because of technical progress. We normalize at 1 the quality of the intermediate good
at time 0, and we denote by q>1 t h es i z eo fe a c hi n n o v a t i o n . I np e r i o dk,w h e r e
k −1 is the number of past innovations, the ﬁnal good can be produced according to
the following constant-returns-to-scale production function:
yk = b X
α
k , 0 <α<1,( 7 )
where labor input is set equal to one, (1 − α) is the share of labor’s income, and
b Xk =
Pk
i=0 qi−1xi is the quality-adjusted index of a composite good which combines all
past generations of intermediate goods. It is convenient to rewrite b Xk as b Xk = qkXk,
where Xk =
Pk
i=0 qi−k−1xi measures the input of the composite intermediate good
in eﬃciency units relative to the last vintage. From the production function (7) one









14In particular, the growth model we develop exhibits scale eﬀects, but our results would continue
to hold in a model with no scale eﬀects, provided that greater incentives to innovate lead to faster
growth (see for example Howitt (1999)).
21where pk is its price. The ﬁnal good may be consumed, used to produce intermediate
goods, or used in research. Independently of its quality, the intermediate good is
produced using the ﬁnal good with a constant marginal rate of transformation that
is normalized to 1.
Technical progress.–
In each period there is a patent race. Incumbents do no research, and there is
free entry by risk-neutral outsiders. In period k,e a c hﬁrm   participating in the race
decides its R&D eﬀort n k to obtain the kth innovation. The R&D eﬀort determines
the expected time of successful completion of the R&D project according to a Poisson
discovery process with a hazard rate equal to λkn k,w i t hλk > 0. The projects of
diﬀerent ﬁrms are independent, so that the aggregate instantaneous probability of
success is simply the sum of the individual probabilities. Let nk =
P
  n k denote
aggregate R&D investment in period k. Then, the innovation occurs according to a
Poisson process with a hazard rate zk = λknk.15
If innovations were drastic, the technological leader would be unconstrained by
outside competition and could engage in monopoly pricing, and so the model’s equi-
librium would be independent of the mode of competition in the product market. We







In a steady-growth equilibrium the price of the (latest vintage of the) intermediate
good, in terms of the consumption good, will be constant. This implies that Xkwill
grow at rate q
α
1−α, and from (7) it then follows immediately that yk will also grow at
rate q
α
1−α. This is the growth factor between periods, and we denote it by g ≡ q
α
1−α.
In a steady state, output, consumption, the input of intermediate goods, proﬁts, and
R&D investment will all grow at rate g between periods.
In order to guarantee the existence of a steady state with positive growth, following
15Our results immediately extend to the case where zk = λkn
β
k ,w i t h0 <β≤ 1 .T h ec a s eβ<1
may reﬂect the presence of external diseconomies in research.
22Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, p. 250) we assume that λk = λg−k.B e c a u s e i n a
steady state nk grows at rate g across periods, under this assumption the hazard
rate zk = λknk can be constant across periods. Finally, note that the following
transversality condition must hold (see Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995, p. 248):
r>z (g − 1).
If this condition is violated, consumers have an incentive to postpone consumption
indeﬁnitely.
Equilibrium in the product market.–
To proceed, remember that only the kth innovator, who holds a patent on his
vintage of the good, can produce the intermediate good of vintage k. Independently
of its quality, the intermediate good is produced using the ﬁnal good on a one-to-one
basis. However, in period k it takes qi−1 units of the intermediate good of vintage
k−i to make one unit of the intermediate good k in eﬃciency units. Innovator k−i’s
unit cost of producing the intermediate good, measured in period k eﬃciency units,
is therefore qi−1. Thus we can proceed as if the intermediate good was homogeneous
but ﬁrms had diﬀerent production costs, i.e. 1 for the latest innovator, q for the
penultimate innovator, q2 for the third latest innovator and so on.




1+q + q2 + ... + qmC
mC + α
(9)
where mCis the largest integer such that16




16It can be shown that mC is constant across periods. With mC
k +1active ﬁrms in period k,t h e
Cournot equilibrium price is
pC
k =





k is the largest integer such that






Because all the parameters in this inequality are constant, mC
k must be constant across periods.
23Individual outputs can be obtained by substituting (9) into (4). Clearly, in each pe-
riod low-cost ﬁrms hold larger market shares than high-cost ﬁrms. However, when
innovations are non-drastic diﬀerent vintages of the intermediate good will be simul-
taneously produced, even if older vintages are less productive.
In contrast, the Bertrand equilibrium is a limit-pricing equilibrium where the leader
prices at pB = q and drives its competitors out of the market. At this limit-pricing
equilibrium, there is no productive ineﬃciency. The corresponding proﬁts are πB
i,k =0











Such a Bertrand equilibrium is standard in the endogenous growth literature. The
next Lemma conﬁrms that a switch from Cournot to Bertrand captures the notion of
tougher competition.





1+q + q2 + ... + qm
m + α
>
αq + q + q2 + ... + qm
m + α








Like in Section 4, we also use a more general reduced-form solution that encom-
passes the Bertrand and Cournot equilibria as special cases. In this solution, p ranges
from pB = q to pC, and the corresponding individual outputs are given by (4). The
equilibrium number of active ﬁrms other than the latest innovator, m(p),i st h el a r g e s t
integer such that m(p) ≤
logp
logq.
Equilibrium in the research industry.–
To complete the derivation of the model’s equilibrium, we next focus on the research
sector. The expected discounted proﬁt of an outside ﬁrm that invests n k units of the
24ﬁnal good in period k to obtain innovation k, as of the start of the race and given
that aggregate investment in R&D is nk,i s
λkn kE(Vk) − n k
r + nkλk
where E(Vk) is the expected value of the kth innovation, and is given by (1). At
equilibrium, outsiders’ expected net proﬁtm u s tb ee q u a lt oz e r o :
λkE(Vk)=1 (10)
In a steady state, z is constant and proﬁts grow at rate g between periods: πi,k =

















(r+z)i+1. Equation (12) determines the equilibrium hazard rate,
z∗, and hence the economy’s rate of growth. To see this, note that the growth factor
between periods, g, is constant. This means that the equilibrium rate of growth is
entirely determined by the expected length of each period, which in turn depends
on the speed of technical progress: with an exponential distribution of the timing of
success, the expected waiting time for each innovation is 1
z. Consequently, an increase
in z is associated with faster growth.
Lemma 4 Assume that
gπ0
r > 1
λ. Then a unique, strictly positive equilibrium hazard
rate z∗ exists.




λ ensures that research is suﬃciently proﬁtable that some research
is conducted at equilibrium. It is easy to show that the steady state level of research,
z∗, is an increasing function of the productivity of R&D eﬀort λ.F o r a n y o t h e r
arbitrary parameter a that inﬂuences z∗,t h es i g no f∂z∗
∂a equals the sign of ∂H
∂a.U s i n g
25this fact, it is immediate to show that z∗ is a decreasing function of the rate of time
preference r and an increasing function the step size between innovations q.I ti sa l s o
clear that the economy’s rate of growth increases with the incentives to innovate. Our
next task is to analyze the impact of a switch from Cournot to Bertrand competition,
or, more generally, a rise in competitive pressure, on the economy’s rate of growth.
Competition and growth.–
Proposition 4 If industry proﬁts are weakly increasing in the intensity of competi-
tion, an increase in the intensity of competition raises the equilibrium rate of growth.
Proof. Let p and p0 denote two price levels, with p<p 0.T h e m o v e f r o m p0
to p corresponds to an increase in the intensity of competition. By assumption,








for all h, with a strict inequality for at least one h.W ea l s ok n o wt h a tm(p) ≤ m(p0).



















































where the terms inside square brackets are positive by the transversality condition.
By inequality (13), each term inside curly brackets on the left hand side is at least
as large as the corresponding term on the right hand side, with at least one strict
inequality. This completes the proof of the Proposition. ¥
26T h ei n t u i t i o ni sa sf o l l o w s .W eh a v es h o w ni nS e c t i o n3t h a tt h ev a l u eo fa ni n n o -
vation is a weighted average of all active ﬁrms’ proﬁts,
Pm
i=0 ωiπi, where the weights
ωi reﬂect the expected length of time periods, discounting, and growth. In a steady
state, the expected length of time periods is constant. The transversality condition
implies that discounting prevails over growth, and so the weights are decreasing in i :
ω0 ≥ ω1 ≥ ... ≥ ωm. The Lorenz dominance result (Proposition 3) shows that a rise
in competitive pressure shifts proﬁts from the least proﬁtable ﬁrms to the most prof-
itable ones. With declining weights, such a front loading of proﬁts implies that the
incentive to innovate
Pm
i=0 ωiπi increases with the intensity of competition, provided
that industry proﬁts do not fall. And in a neo-Schumpeterian model an increase in
the incentive to innovate must cause an increase in the economy’s rate of growth.
Proposition 4 leads to the following corollaries.
Corollary 1 If innovations are suﬃciently large (i.e., if the size of the innovations,
q,i sc l o s et o 1
α), then the rate of growth under Bertrand competition is higher than
the rate of growth under Cournot competition.
Proof. Follows from Propositions 1 and 4. ¥
Numerical calculations show that as q falls, eventually ΠB(q) < ΠC(q).B yP r o p o s i -
tion 4, this means that the rate of growth can (but need not) be greater with Cournot
competition if the size of innovations is suﬃciently small. Numerical calculations also
show that the interval in which aggregate proﬁts are greater under Bertrand competi-
tion, and thus more competition is surely associated with faster growth, can be quite
large. Figure 3 illustrates.
[Figure 3 here]
Stokey (1995) notes that if innovations occur every few years, a reasonable range
for q is 1.02 to 1.04; if innovations occur only a couple of times per century, then
a reasonable range for q is 1.25 to 1.50. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) note that
reasonable values for α, the share of capital’s income, range from 0.30 if capital is
interpreted as physical capital to 0.70 if capital includes human capital. The shaded
27area in Figure 3 corresponds to the “reasonable” range q ∈ [1.02,1.50] and α ∈
[0.30,0.70]. Over this range, more intense competition may well be associated with
faster growth.
Corollary 2 If the intensity of competition is suﬃciently high (i.e., p is close to the
Bertrand equilibrium price q), a further increase in the intensity of competition raises
the economy’s rate of growth.
Proof. Follows from Propositions 2 and 4. ¥
In fact, the relationship between competition and growth is monotonically increas-
ing when the size of innovations is large. For smaller innovations, numerical cal-
culations show that industry proﬁts ﬁrst increase and then decrease as p increases.
Consequently, unless the front loading of proﬁts is suﬃciently strong to outweigh
the eﬀect of tougher competition on total industry proﬁts, the rate of growth ﬁrst
decreases and then increases as the intensity of competition increases.17
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we have re-considered the relationship between competition and
growth in a standard neo-Schumpeterian model with improvements in the quality
of products. Focusing on the case of non-drastic innovations, we have modeled the
notion of lower competition by a switch from Bertrand to Cournot competition, and
more generally by a decrease in the equilibrium price.
We have shown that competition is good for growth either if the size of (non-
drastic) innovations is large, or if the intensity of competition is high, or both. This
result follows from two qualitatively new eﬀects — the front loading of proﬁts and the
productive eﬃciency eﬀect — that arise when innovators are not immediately displaced
by the occurrence of the next innovation so that two or more asymmetric ﬁrms are
simultaneously active in the same industry.
17These results hold provided that only two ﬁrms are active in the Cournot equilibrium. When
innovations are still smaller, such that three ﬁrms are active under Cournot competition, the rela-
tionship between competition and growth can exhibit two local maxima.
28We conclude with a brief discussion of repeated innovation by incumbents, patent
licensing, welfare, and the inverted-U shaped relationship between competition and
growth.
Persistent leadership.–
In our model, incumbents do no research and are systematically replaced by out-
siders. However, there is ample evidence that incumbents account for much of the
research done and the resulting pattern of persistent leadership is well documented
in many industries. As discussed at greater length in Denicolò (2001), the literature
that tries to explain this pattern of persistent leadership recognizes that in standard
quality ladder models leapfrogging is indeed an equilibrium of a simultaneous moves
R&D game if the size of innovations is not too small. In this case, the assumption
that incumbents do no research is not restrictive. However, the standard model can
be adapted to make room for the persistence of leadership in various ways. If, for
example, it is assumed that incumbents have a ﬁrst-mover advantage in the patent
race starting after the latest innovation, the outcome is a pre-emption equilibrium in
which all research is done by incumbents. However, the amount of research is still
determined by the outsiders’ zero-proﬁt condition, and thus the incentive to innovate
is driven by the same qualitative eﬀects as in the leapfrogging equilibrium.
Patent licensing.–
We have followed the vast majority of endogenous growth models in ruling out
patent licensing. The standard justiﬁcation for this assumption is that licensing
agreements between successive innovators would have anti-competitive eﬀects and as
such would be prohibited by antitrust authorities. In our model, however, patent
licensing agreements could be arranged so as to improve productive eﬃciency with
no anticompetitive eﬀects, and so ruling them out is not as innocent an assumption
as in earlier models.
If patent licensing was ubiquitous, all of the output would be produced with the
most eﬃcient technology and so the productive eﬃciency eﬀect would vanish. How-
ever, a variety of transaction costs impede licensing agreements. As an example,
royalty licensing is possible only if the output is veriﬁable; when individual output is
not veriﬁable, and only ﬁxed-fee licensing is feasible, licensing will occur at equilibrium
29only if the size of innovations is suﬃciently small. As another example, incomplete
information over the size of the innovation can lead parties to introduce ineﬃcient
terms in the licensing agreement. In addition, innovative technological knowledge
can be diﬃcult to codify and transmit to others. These transaction costs may likely
result in an equilibrium outcome in which some active ﬁrms do not use the latest
generation technology. To the extent that the product market equilibrium exhibits
some productive ineﬃciency, our qualitative results are likely to continue to hold even
if we allow for some licensing agreements.
Welfare.–
Although a detailed welfare analysis is outside the scope of this paper, a few remarks
are in order. Our analysis shows that an increase in the intensity of competition has
two eﬀects on social welfare, a static eﬀect and a dynamic eﬀect. The static eﬀect is
unambiguously positive. Indeed, for any given state of the technology, the price of the
intermediate good is lower and output is greater with tougher competition. Further, if
competition is Bertrand, only the most eﬃcient ﬁrm is active in the intermediate good
industry and so only the highest quality good is produced in equilibrium, ensuring that
productive eﬃciency is achieved. The dynamic eﬀect, that operates via the incentive
to innovate and the rate of growth, is more complex. As we have seen, competition can
be growth-enhancing or growth-reducing. In addition, the equilibrium rate of growth
can exceed the socially optimal rate, which means that faster growth is not necessarily
socially beneﬁcial. Therefore, the overall welfare eﬀect of tougher competition is
generally ambiguous.
An inverted-U shaped relationship.–
Nickell (1996) and Aghion et al. (2002) ﬁnd evidence that the relationship between
competition and growth is inverted-U shaped. Although this evidence is hardly con-
clusive,18 it is tempting to speculate whether our model can generate an inverted-U
shaped relationship. While we have let the equilibrium price range from pC to pB = q,
it is possible to extend the analysis to the case p<p B. Of course, in this interval only
t h et e c h n o l o g i c a ll e a d e rw o u l db ea c t i v ei nt h ep r o d u c tm a r k e t . T h ei n t e r p r e t a t i o n
18Aghion et al. (2002) recognize that the evidence is fragmentary, while Nickell (1996) calls the
evidence “thin.”
30of the case p<p B is that because of imperfect patent protection and technologi-
cal spillovers, competitive pressure exerted by the leader’s most eﬃcient rival sets
a tighter constraint on the price that the leader can charge than in the standard
Bertrand equilibrium.19 When p<p B, both the productive eﬃciency eﬀect and the
front loading of proﬁts disappear, and so tougher competition unambiguously leads
to lower proﬁts and growth. Remember, however, that when the equilibrium price p
is just above pB, tougher product market competition leads to faster growth. This
implies that growth is (locally) fastest with Bertrand competition, and in the vicin-
ity of the Bertrand equilibrium the relationship between competition and growth is
inverted U-shaped.
19It could be debated whether the existence of incomplete patent protection and technological
spillovers can be equated to a rise in competitive pressure. However, the two phenomena are diﬃcult
to distinguish observationally, as they both translate into lower price-cost margins.
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34APPENDIX
Omitted details in the proof of Lemma 1.–



















































whence the result follows immediately. Next, note that
m X
i=0
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ci (ci − ˆ c)
because the ﬁr s ta n dt h i r dt e r mo nt h er i g h th a n ds i d ec a n c e lo u t .B u t
Pm
i=0 ci (ci − ˆ c)
is the variance of active ﬁrms’ marginal costs, σ2
c, and so the second equality in (6)
is obtained. ¥
35P r o o fo fL e m m a2 . –
From (6) we have
d
dp
(p − ¯ c)=1 −
Pm(p)
i=0 (ci − ˆ c)2






(p − ˆ c)
2 − (ci − ˆ c)2¤
[m(p)+1 ]( p − ˆ c)
2 ≥ 0
where the inequality follows because p ≥ cm(p). ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 . –
When c1 = pM(c0) we have pB = pC = pM(c0) and xC
1 = xB
1 =0 ;c o n s e q u e n t l y ,
ΠB = ΠC. Starting from c1 = pM(c0), let us consider the eﬀect of a small decrease in
c1, such that xC
1 becomes positive. Because ΠB(c1)=( c1 − c0)X(c1),w eh a v e
dΠB
dc1
= X(c1)+( c1 − c0)X
0(c1)
and so dΠB
dc1 =0at c1 = pM(c0). On the other hand, when c1 is just below pM(c0),
exactly two ﬁrms will be active in the Cournot equilibrium. Thus, ΠC(c1)=( pC −
c0)xC
0 +( pC − c1)xC






























































p0(XC) is positive given the assumption of decreasing marginal
revenue. Clearly, under our assumptions of constant marginal costs and decreasing
marginal revenue we have
dpC
dc1




This means that ΠC(c1) raises more steeply than ΠB(c1) in a left neighborhood of
pM(c0). By continuity, it follows that ΠB(c1) > ΠC(c1) in a left neighborhood of
pM(c0). ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 . –
Let p and p0 denote two price levels, with p<p 0.T h em o v ef r o mp0 to p corresponds
to an increase in the intensity of competition. We must show that LΠ(p)( h
s+1) ≤
LΠ(p0)( h
















(p − cj)3(ci − cj)






for all i,j =0 ,1,...,m with j>i . (A1)
20As is well known, under Cournot competition and constant asymmetric marginal costs, the price
i st h es a m ea si fa l lﬁrms shared the same cost ˆ c.I ti sa l s ow e l lk n o w nt h a ti nas y m m e t r i cm o d e l
with decreasing marginal revenue, the Cournot equilibrium price increases with the marginal cost.

















s+1) <L Π(p0)( s
s+1).
Clearly, (A1) also implies LΠ(p)( 1
s+1) ≤ LΠ(p0)( 1
s+1). Now suppose to the contrary
that there exists i such that LΠ(p)( i
s+1) >L Π(p0)( i
s+1).L e th be the minimum value
of i for which inequality LΠ(p)( i
s+1) >L Π(p0)( i


































but this violates (A1). This contradiction establishes the result. ¥
P r o o fo fL e m m a4 . –













(i +1 ) zigi(πi − gπi+1)
(r + z)
i+2 −
(m +1 ) zmgm+1πm
(r + z)
m+2
38As u ﬃcient condition for H0(z) to be negative is that πi ≥ gπi+1. We know from the
p r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3t h a tt h er a t i o
πi(p)















for all i and for all p. Consequently, it suﬃces to show that π0(p) ≥ gπ1(p) when
p equals the monopoly price 1
α, which always exceeds the Cournot equilibrium price























1−α (1 − αq)
2
At q =1 , the weak inequality is satisﬁed as an equality. To conclude the proof, it
suﬃces to show that the derivative with respect to q of the right hand side of the














1−α−1 [(q − 1) + q(1 − α)] < 0.
This completes the proof that H0(z) > 0, which implies that the equilibrium, if it
exists, is unique. To show existence, note that H(0) =
gπ0
r > 1
λ and limz→∞ H(z)=0 .




Industry profits under Bertrand and Cournot competition as a function of c1  
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The effect of an increase in the equilibrium price p on industry profits  
























Industry profits under Bertrand and Cournot competition as a function of the 






B Π  > 
C Π  
    
B Π  < 
C Π  
q 
   α 
1 
1 
 
 
αq = 1